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Abstract--Recently, Ham and Lin have first proposed a d3~ z~m;c access control scheme with combi- 
nation of user authentication t  prevent the possible separate s curity threats to these two protection 
modules. The security of the Harn-Lin scheme r lies on the computational difficulty of solving the 
large primes factorization problem. In this paper, we propose another dynamic access control scheme 
with integration ofuser authentication based on the computational difficulty of solving the discrete 
logarithm problem. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In traditional computer systems, protection of sensitive data is achieved by user authentication, 
usually by password verification [1,2,3], and access control for privilege request [1,4-6]. A user 
passing through the user authentication will be assigned a unique identity during the time of 
staying in the system. The unique user identity will be used repeatedly for subsequent privileged 
resource access control. In most traditional systems, the unique user identity is used repeatedly 
and the user authentication process will not be referred to again. Obviously, the more frequently 
user authentication is performed, the better system security can be achieved. Therefore, the idea 
of the integration of user authentication a d access control comes out. 
Based on the above observation, Harn and Lin [7] have proposed an access control scheme 
with integration of user authentication recently. In their scheme, user authentication a d access 
control are combined together to prevent he possible security threats between or into these 
two protection modules individually. In [8], it is shown that some redundant information and 
verification operations exist in their scheme. In [8], another more compact and efficient scheme 
with the same security level and characteristics a  Ham and Lin's original work is proposed which 
takes only half the computational complexity of the original work. 
The security of the Harn-Lin scheme is shown to rely on the computational difficulty of solving 
the large primes factorization problem as the well-known RSA cryptosystem [9]. In this paper, 
we propose another dynamic access control scheme with integration of user authentication based 
on the computational difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem as in the Diffie-Hellman 
key distribution scheme [10] and the EIGamal cryptosystem [11]. Almost all the modern crypto- 
graphic systems have been developed under some reasonable cryptographic assumptions such as 
the large primes factorisation problem or the discrete logarithm problem. These two computa- 
tionally difficult problems have not been shown to be the NP-complete problems yet. The above 
two computationally difficult assumptions appear easonable today, while there is no guarantee 
that efficient algorithms for integer factorization or discrete logarithm evaluation will not be dis- 
covered. This motivates the authors to devise a scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem 
and differs from the previous works. 
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2. REVIEW OF THE HARN-LIN SCHEME 
In the Harn-Lin scheme, during the registration phase, the system chooses two large secret 
primes p and q and publishes a publicly known number N = p x q. Also, a number ~ E [2, N - 1] 
is selected such that GCD(~,N) = 1. For each file Fj, j = 1,2, . . . ,m,  an odd prime efj is 
assigned such that efj x dfj -- 1 mod ~(N) where ~b(N) is the number of positive integers not 
exceeding N and relatively prime to N. For the file Fj with privilege r, a token KFj,r is computed 
as follows 
KFj,~ = a dl~" mod N. (1) 
A parameter of the system called the master key is defined as 
Km=ter = a (I'[ d/j . . . .  ) mod N, for j = 1,2,... ,m, (2) 
where rma x is the highest privilege in the system. The system keeps Kmute  r secret and makes T 
publicly known, where 
t i t  
T = I I  ef j .  (3) 
j=l 
After the above preparation, the system assigns to each user IDi an odd prime eui, i = 1, 2, . . . ,  n, 
and computes dui such that dui x eui = I mod ~b(N). The system then computes the associated 
password for IDi with access privilege ri,j to file Fj, j = 1,2,...  ,m, as 
PWi = a d=`x(I'[ a / ' . i )  mod N, for j = 1, 2, . . . ,  m. (4) 
For this password, the system computes another public parameter ti for the user IDi as 
m 
t, = I I  ef / ' , ' .  (5) 
j=l 
In the verification phase, the user IDi makes a request (IDi, PWi, t~, Fj, r) to access file Fj with 
privilege r to the system. The system first checks if IDi is a legitimate user, and then determines 
 'eS; 
If the above check passes, the system then computes the following two values V and V ~ 
V = (Km,~ter) T . . . .  /e/J" mod N,  
V' - (PW~) *u'xt'/'h" mod N. 
(6) 
(7) 
If V = V ~, the user is authenticated and the access request is granted. Otherwise, the request 
is denied. The above verification operation takes about two modular exponentiations. 
The Harn-Lin method possesses almost all the advantages of the existing access control schemes 
in the literature. Furthermore, their system is, in essence, a dynamic scheme which can provide 
insertion and deletion of users and files and can grant new access privilege and the revocation of 
old access quite easily. 
3. THE PROPOSED DYNAMIC ACCESS CONTROL SCHEMES 
WITH USER AUTHENTICATION 
In this section, we propose another access control scheme with user authentication based on a 
cryptographic assumption differing from the previous works. The computation of this proposed 
scheme is in the finite field of GF(P)  where P is a large prime as in the Difiie-Hellman key 
distribution scheme [10] and the EIGamal cryptosystem [11]. 
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The Proposed Scheme 
In this scheme, during the registration phase, the system chooses and publishes a large prime P 
such that ~b(P - 1) is a large number and a primitive element t~ of GF(P). The ¢(P - 1) means 
the number of positive integers not exceeding (P -  1) and relatively prime to (P -  1). The system 
then selects two secret numbers $1 and 82 in [2, P - 1] such that GCD(S2, P - 1) = 1. For each 
file F i (j = 1,2,. . .  ,m) with privilege r, an identity f [ j , r ]  is computed as follows 
IL/, r] = g(F i  II r), (8) 
where g(.) is a system secret one-way function with its result in the finite field GF(P) and II 
meAna concatenation. 
After the above preparation, the system computes the password PWi for IDi (where 
GCD( ID i ,P -  1) = 1) and its associated parameter ti with access privilege r i j  to the asso- 
ciated set of files SFi of IDi 
PWi  ~ ot k mod P, (9) 
t i=  IX f [ j , ( r id) ]= 1"I g(Fj [[rid), (10) 
FjESFi FjESFI 
satisfying tl x $1 + k × IDi xS~ = 1 mod (P - 1). (11) 
During the verification phase, the user IDi makes a request (IDi, PWi, ti, F i , rid, r) to access 
file Fj with privilege r to the system. The system first checks if IDi is a legitimate user, and 
then determines if f[j, (r~j)]lt~ and (r~j) >_ r. After the above checks, the system checks if the 
following condition holds 
(PWi)lV, xSa X ~t,xSl  -- ot mod P. (12) 
If it holds, the user is authenticated and the access request is granted. Otherwise, the request 
is denied. The overall verification operation is summarized in Figure 1. The above verification 
can be performed with only 708 modular multiplications, which is about 1.17 times of a general 
modular exponentiation (for P to be a 512-bit number) using the technology proposed by the 
authors in [12]. 
l 
is ~_~o 
IDi valid ? 
Yes rejected 
i S1 $2 
is 
IDi*S2 t ioS l  
(PWi) * ~_ ~ mod P? 
~No IYes 
rejected 
Access request granted 
C)  : user supplied information 
gfFj II r i j) t t i 
8~ (rid) >~ r ? 
rejected 
Figure 1. The proposed ynamic access control scheme with integration of user 
authentication. 
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Password Updating Process 
In this proposed scheme, the system access control matrix can be modified easily by changing 
or issuing passwords of the related users. Same as in the Harn-Lin scheme [7], the modifications 
include 
(i) insertion of a new user 
(ii) deletion of an old user 
(iii) insertion of a new file 
(iv) deletion of an old file 
(v) grant of access right 
(vi) revocation of access right. 
So, this system is a dynamic scheme. In case (i), registration operation is required. In cases (ii) 
or (iv), user's identity or file's identity must be removed from the system table. In cases (iii), 
(v), or (vi), passwords of the related users must be changed. 
In this proposed ynamic access control scheme, in cases (iii), (v) ,  or (vi), the passwords of the 
related users can be updated easily and the users need not go back to the system administrator 
for phys ica l  ident i ty  veri f icat ion, then obtaining the new passwords. Here we give a password 
updating process for the proposed ynamic access control scheme. Suppose that the old privilege 
to the file Fw of user ID 0 is r 0,w, then 
PWo,old --- O~ k°ld rood P, 
tO,°ld-- ]-~ f[J,(rsJ)]-- ~ g(~ll"sj), 
FjESFf FjESF e 
satisfying t0,ol d × $1 -P kold × ID 0 ×So - 1 mod (P  - 1). 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
If the user IDs's privilege to the file Fw is granted to be r~e,w (where r'0, w > re,w) then 
PWf,new -.- ¢~k~.. mod P, 
- to,old × Y[w, ("'o,w)l 
= to,old × g(Fw II "o,w) 
satisfying t0,ne w x $1 ~- knew × ID o ×$2 - I mod (P  - 1). 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
After evaluating knew and kold, the system can obtain the number kd such that 
kd -- knew - kold mod (P  - 1), (19) 
then publishes the following announcement 
{ , } ID o, Fw, r0,w, r o,w, c~k~, td = (f[w, (r's,w)]) pw''°'d mod P (20) 
in a public file of the system. The user ID s can update his/her password PWg,new and the 
parameter t0,new as follows 
PWs,new - PWf,old × ~kd mod P, 
f PW ;.'o,d ) 
to,new = t0,oi d X ~t d f mod P. 
(21) 
(22) 
Batch Access Request Verification 
For practical applications, several objects (files or resources) are sometimes requested by a 
subject with some corresponding privileges at the same time. In the conventional access control 
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schemes [1,4-6], each resource request with a privilege has to be verified individually which will 
be very time consuming. In [8], the authors proposed a concept called the batch  access request 
verification which can also be applied to the proposed scheme in this paper. For example, if the 
user IDi submits the request (IDi, PWi, ti, [Fm, rl,m, rm], [Fn, ri,., rn]) to file Fm with privilege rm 
and to file F .  with privilege r . .  The system first checks if 
f [m,  (r,,rn)] x f in ,  (r,,.)]lt,, (r,,..) > r,., and (r, , .)  > rn, (23) 
then checks if 
(pwi)IDi x$2 × atlxSt -- a mod P. (24) 
This batch type access request verification is very practical and efficient for the applications in 
real environments. 
Security Analysis 
Here, we give some security considerations of the proposed scheme. First, let ID 0 be a legiti- 
mate user who knows PW0,e - a t ,  rood P and t0,c (for c = 1,2, . . .  ,h) satisfying the following 
equations 
to ,¢xSt+kex IDoxS2=_ lmod(P - l ) ,  for c = 1 ,2 , . . . ,h .  (25) 
Multiplying each equation by a number Ac and taking some manipulations, the user ID 0 can 
t obtain PW~ and t 0 as follows 
satisfying 
PW~ - (]~I PW°'e A°) (y'~Ac)-I m°d P' e=l 
: = Ae X X Ac tg tO,c , 
c----1 
(26) 
(27) 
t~ x $1 + k: x IDg xS~ - 1 mod (P  - 1), (28) 
such that PW~ = a ~' mod P. (29) 
Suppose that user ID e wishes to pretend having privilege r~, v larger than what is given to 
him to access the file Fv (i.e., r~, v > rg,r _> 0). Without knowing f[v,(r~,v)], user ID, is 
: I ' such that f[v,(rg,~)]ltg. This is the reason for g(*) to be a impossible to generate a number tg 
secret one-way function and the number td in the password updating announcement to be in an 
encryption form. It is impossible for IDg to extract f[v, (r~,v) ] from td of an intercepted password 
updating announcement because ID 9 does not know either the base number or the exponent of 
the encrypted message fd. 
Another security consideration for the proposed scheme, let ID 0 be a legitimate user who 
knows two pairs of numbers {PWg - a k mod P, tg} and {PW~g - ak' mod P, t~} satisfying the 
following equations 
tg X S 1 - [ -k X ID 9 xS2 - 1 mod (P -  1), (30) 
t~ x $1 + k ~ x IDg x $2 - I mod (P - 1). (31) 
If the discrete logarithm problem can be feasibly solved then the user IDg can extract out the 
exponents t and /d. Substituting b and k: into the above system of equations, the system 
secrets $1 and S~ can be evaluated. 
On the other hand, under the assumption of discrete logarithm to be computationaily nfeasible, 
to extract he two secret numbers $1 and $2, user ID 0 has to solve the following two equations 
t 0 x X + ID 0 xY  - 1 mod (P - 1), (32) 
Y - A x B rood (P - 1), such that a A _= PW 0 modP, (33) 
to obtain the possible solution of Sx = X and $2 = B. 
It is obvious that the solution space of the pair of numbers {X, Y} is O(~(P - 1)). In the 
proposed scheme, the attacker is hard to find out the exact values of $1 and $2 from the space 
of O(~(P  - 1)); even user ID 0 has many pairs of numbers {PW 0, t0). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Almost all the modern cryptographic systems have been developed under some reasonable cryp- 
tographic assumptions such as the large primes factorization problem or the discrete logarithm 
problem. The above two computational difficult assumptions appear reasonable today, while 
there is no guarantee that efficient algorithms for integer factorization or discrete logarithm eval- 
uation will not be discovered. In this paper, we propose another dynamic access control scheme 
with integration of user authentication. In the proposed scheme, the security relies on solving the 
discrete logarithm problem and differs from the reliance of the previous works. All the advantages 
and characteristics of the previous work of dynamic access control with user authentication is
preserved in this new scheme. 
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